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"[S]ociety's accumulated myths and fears about disability and dis-
ease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from actual impairment."
Justice Brennan1
I. INTRODUCTION: EMPLOYEES WITH AIDS-THE EPIDEMIC
HITS THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
Deaths attributable to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS") continue to increase worldwide at epidemic proportions.2
1. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
2. The AIDS epidemic has affected every continent. See RANDY SHILTS, AND THE
BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 564-66 (1987); see also
Steve Rabin, Kenya: AIDS as if it Mattered, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1991, at C5 (reporting that
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At least one million Americans carry the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus ("HIV")3 that causes AIDS. An estimated 40,000 Americans
will become infected this year.' In response, President Bush declared
war against AIDS. 6 The battle for many HIV-infected Americans,
however, begins years before they contract AIDS, when they are
treated like lepers in their own communities.7
Although AIDS is incurable and fatal, there are only five docu-
mented transmission modes:' (1) sharing needles with an infected
person; (2) unprotected sexual contact with an infected person; (3)
receiving a transfusion of tainted blood or blood products; (4) from an
infected mother to fetus during pregnancy or while breast-feeding;
and (5) in rare instances, blood-to-blood contact initiated through a
cut.9 Many people, nevertheless, wrongly believe HIV is highly con-
6.9 million Africans are HIV-positive); Mia S. Vansun, Ignorance Continues to Hobble Fight
Against Killer, VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 7, 1991, at C5 (reporting World Health Organization
estimate that by the year 2000, forty million people worldwide will be HIV-positive; currently,
50,000 to 100,000 Canadians are estimated to be infected); Alison White, Fighting the Virus of
Fear in the Workplace, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 18, 1990, at 24 (Britain reports 14,723 HIV-
positive citizens of which 3,884 have developed AIDS).
3. HIV attacks the body's immune system and prevents it from fighting other types of
infections. AIDS is defined as the presence of HIV as well as one or more of the related
infections resulting from the suppression of the immune system. Donald R. Hoover, et al., The
Effect of Changing the Definition of AIDS on the Modeling of AIDS, 267 JAMA 273 (1992).
4. Malcolm Gladwell, An Epidemic the Public Might Finally Confront: Johnson Could
End Stigma of Aids, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1991, at Al.
5. Id.; see also Employment and Earnings, 35 U.S. Dept. of Lab., Bur. of Lab. Stat. 13,
93, 194 (1988) (reporting that 5.7% of the American workforce has full-blown AIDS); Inst. of
Med., NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCE, CONFRONTING AIDS-UPDATE 1988 49-50 (1988)
(estimating that between 945,000 and 1.4 million Americans are HIV-positive).
6. Bush Says Nation is on 'Wartime Footing' Against AIDS, Assails Bias, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1990, at 2.
7. Some people believe that HIV-infected individuals should not be permitted to attend
ordinary schools, maintain normal jobs, and live in public housing. See Robert J. Blendon &
Karen Donelan, Discrimination Against People with AIDS: The Public's Perspective, 319 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1022, 1023-24 (1988). Such beliefs are reflected in controversies reaching the
courts. See, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (challenging school
board's decision barring HIV-infected child from attending elementary school); Glanz v.
Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991) (alleging discrimination in surgeon's refusal to
perform emergency ear operation on HIV-infected patient); Jasperson v. Jessica's Nail Clinic,
265 Cal. Rptr. 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (contesting refusal to provide pedicure to HIV-
infected individual); Y Person v. X Corp., 606 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (seeking
declaratory judgment that HIV-positive employee submit to physical and mental
examination); Hurwitz v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, 535 N.Y.S.2d 1007
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (challenging dentist's refusal to treat AIDS patient), af'd, 553 N.Y.S.2d
323 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
8. See RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE, A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW
217-219 (1988); see also How People Catch the AIDS Virus, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 1991, at 8B.
The average time span from HIV infection to AIDS diagnosis is eight to ten years, with an
average life span of 1 1/2 to three years following AIDS diagnosis. Id.
9. Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 718 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Larry
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tagious and fear infection through casual contact with infected per-
sons.'0 Irrational fear of infection has resulted in HIV-infected
workers losing their jobs after disclosing their HIV-positive status. I"
In fact, discrimination in the workplace is the leading type of discrim-
ination faced by HIV-infected individuals.' 2
The courts have begun to address HIV and AIDS discrimination
in the workplace. A lawyer, 3 physician,14 and nurse15 were first to
challenge their dismissals under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 197316 (the "Act"), which prohibits federally-funded employers
from discriminating against handicapped individuals.' 7 Although the
Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health
Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 15 (1989) (listing studies that show
the occupational risk of acquiring HIV in health care setting is extremely low); How People
Catch the AIDS Virus, supra note 8.
10. See Blendon & Donelan, supra note 7, at 1023-25. According to current medical
knowledge, HIV cannot be transmitted by casual contact with an infected person, toilet seats,
doorknobs, air-conditioning, coughing, sneezing, urine, feces, sputum, nasal secretions, saliva,
sweat, tears, or vomit. See Nolley, 776 F. Supp. at 718.
11. See, e.g., Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1102
(1991) (HIV-positive reserve member released from active duty in the naval reserve recruiter
program); Benjamin v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1990) (exterminator
discharged after he voluntarily told his supervisor that he was HIV-positive); Doe v.
Westchester Cty. Med. Ctr., No. lB-P-D-87-117683, slip op. (N.Y. Exec. Dep't Div. of
Human Rights, filed Oct. 23, 1987) (pharmacist's offer of employment revoked after HIV-
positive status revealed to prospective employer).
12. Daily Lab. Rep. No. 120 (BNA), Jun. 21, 1990, at A-9 (noting employment
discrimination as the most commonly reported HIV-related discrimination complaint); see also
Philip J. Hilts, New Study Says AIDS Bias Grows Faster than Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 17,
1990, at 20.
13. Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (attorney sued law firm following
termination after voluntary disclosure of AIDS condition).
14. Doe v. Attorney Gen., 723 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Cal. 1989), affid in part, vac. in part,
rev'd in part, 941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991) (HIV-infected physician sued FBI after it stopped
referring agents and applicants to the clinic where he worked).
15. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (nurse sued hospital after
discharge for failure to disclose the results of a HIV test, which was requested because he was
gay and lived with an AIDS patient).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1991) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 26, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394) (1973). The Act is commonly referred to by its public law number,
"Section 504". Section 504 in pertinent part states: "no otherwise qualified individual with
handicaps.., shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Id. § 794(a) (emphasis added).
17. Handicapped employees also have challenged their dismissals and mandatory AIDS-
testing programs under state laws and under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
See, e.g., Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 831-33 (HIV-infected nurse challenged dismissal on Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds); Local 1812, American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Department of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D.D.C. 1987) (mandatory AIDS-testing program
challenged on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds); Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp.
954 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (police officer suffering from epilepsy sued city under Section 504 and the
Fourteenth amendment); Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 672 (attorney with AIDS contested
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Supreme Court has yet to address HIV or AIDS discrimination in the
workplace, several courts have concluded that HIV-positive workers
qualify as "handicapped" under the Act. 9
Recently, in Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control District,2"
an HIV-infected firefighter sued under Section 504, claiming that his
condition was the sole basis for his termination by the fire depart-
ment. Mr. Severino was terminated after voluntarily disclosing his
HIV-positive status to the Fire Chief and refusing to perform the non-
firefighter related tasks subsequently assigned to him because of his
disclosure. 2' Contrary to other recent handicap and AIDS discrimi-
nation cases, the court held in favor of the employer even though the
employer admitted changing Mr. Severino's duties solely because of
his HIV-positive status and failed to introduce evidence that HIV-
positive firefighters posed risks to co-workers or the public."
The district court concluded that the employee failed to present a
prima facie case under Section 504, finding that he was not terminated
"solely" because of his handicap.23 Specifically, the district court
found that the employee had been terminated as a result of his refusal
to perform the "light duty" tasks assigned to him after he disclosed
termination under Pennsylvania's Handicap Act); Benjamin v. Orkin Extermination Co., 390
S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1990) (HIV-infected exterminator challenged termination under Virginia
handicap law); M.A.E. v. Doe & Roe, 566 A.2d 285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (administrator of an
employee's estate sued employer under state's Human Relations Act). Notably, all fifty states
and the District of Columbia have enacted handicap statutes. See Gostin, supra note 9, at 45.
Because Mr. Severino voluntarily submitted to a blood test and disclosed the results to his
employer, his Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated and this Note will not address
this issue. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see generally Charles D. Curran, Note,
Mandatory Testing of Public Employees For the Human Immunodeficiency Virus: The Fourth
Amendment and Medical Reasonableness, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 720 (1990).
18. For purposes of this Note, the terms "HIV discrimination" and "AIDS
discrimination" mean the workplace discrimination HIV-infected individuals face at any stage
of their disease.
19. See, e.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701, 704 (9th
Cir. 1988); Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 632 (E.D. Mo. 1991); Ray v. School
Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1536 (M.D. Fla. 1987). Similarly, state courts have construed state
handicap acts as protecting HIV-infected individuals from discrimination. See, e.g., M.A.E.,
566 A.2d at 287 (noting that Pennsylvania's Human Relations Act covers AIDS and its related
conditions) (Cavanaugh, J., concurring); see also Gostin, supra note 9, at 45; infra note 58 and
accompanying text.
20. 935 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1991).
21. Id. at 1180.
22. See id. Compare Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954, 954 (M.D. Fla. 1978)
(holding handicapped applicant's Section 504 rights were violated based on Police Chief's
admission that he considered an epileptic unfit to withstand the working conditions and nature
of a police officer's job).
23. Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., No. 88-142, slip op. at 49 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 15, 1990) (mem.), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1179 (1lth Cir. 1991).
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his HIV-positive status.24 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the same basis.25
This Note disputes the reasoning and conclusion reached by the
court of appeals with respect to the employee's Section 504 prima
facie case. Part II explores the development of AIDS discrimination
law in the context of Section 504 jurisprudence. Next, it examines the
burden of proof created by the Supreme Court in School Board v.
Arline26 to resolve discrimination cases where the "handicap" is a
contagious disease-the framework applied by both the trial and
appellate court in Severino. To place Severino in perspective, the Note
also reviews other cases in which employees infected by a contagious
disease have challenged their terminations under Section 504.
Part III details Severino's procedural and factual background.
Part IV questions the appellate court's application of the Arline
framework and argues that Mr. Severino established a prima facie
case of handicap discrimination by showing that he was reassigned
solely because of his HIV-positive status without evidence that regu-
lar firefighting duties posed a risk to co-workers or the public. This
Part further argues that the court focused on the wrong level of the
employer's conduct in determining that the employee was not dis-
charged because of his HIV-positive status, by ignoring the fact that
his reassignment to light duty was illegal. This Part also argues that
the court relied on irrelevant factors in assessing whether Mr. Sever-
ino was "otherwise qualified" under Section 504, and failed to engage
in an individualized inquiry to determine whether his HIV-positive
status mandated the light duty reassignment.
This Note proposes that courts find a prima facie case of handi-
cap discrimination once an employer admits that it based an adverse
employment decision, such as reassignment to light duty, on an
employee's handicap. To rebut a prima facie case of discrimination,
the employer would have to show medical evidence that the employee
could not be otherwise accommodated.
Severino represents an alarming erosion of handicapped individu-
als' rights. First, it lowers an employer's burden of proof under Sec-
tion 504 so that virtually any excuse articulated by an employer can
defeat the causation element of a Section 504 claim. Second, it implic-
itly sanctions adverse employment decisions by employers without
requiring a showing of necessity. If adopted by other courts, the
24. Id. at 50.
25. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1182.
26. 480 U.S. 273 (1987), reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987), on remand, 692 F. Supp. 286
(M.D. Fla. 1988).
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Severino rationale could seriously undermine the rights of the handi-
capped under Section 504 as well as the newly enacted Americans
with Disabilities Act. 27
II. PERSPECTIVE
A. The Development of Section 504 Jurisprudence in
the Workplace
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 gives handicapped
individuals a private right of action for discrimination by federally-
funded agencies and certain private entities. 28 The Act's primary pur-
pose is to promote handicapped employment by prohibiting discrimi-
nation against handicapped persons who are "otherwise qualified" to
perform a job.2 9 The language of the Act promises "to share with
handicapped Americans the opportunity for... jobs that [non-handi-
capped] Americans take for granted."' 30 To achieve this goal, the Act
protects handicapped individuals from any adverse employment deci-
sion improperly based on their handicap.3'
Section 504 was patterned after Title VII, 32 which prohibits dis-
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-213 (1991). The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in
pertinent part provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id.
§ 12112(a). The ADA also extends handicapped protection to the private sector. Id. § 12101.
Since the ADA also protects the handicapped, courts might refer to Section 504 cases in
construing the ADA.
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1991); see Pushkin v. Regent of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372,
1380 (10th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that the Act created a private cause of action); see also Doe
v. Attorney Gen., 723 F. Supp. 452, 489-91 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, vac. in part, rev'd in
part, 941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991), on remand, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS *20136 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (recognizing a private right of action against an entity receiving federal funds that
discriminates against handicapped persons).
29. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984). The Act also
prohibits discrimination against the handicapped in education, public accommodations, and
housing. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (stating ADA's goals).
30. 123 CONG. REC. S13515 (1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); see also Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 (1985) (stating that Section 504's central purpose is to assure that
handicapped individuals receive "evenhanded treatment" in relation to non-handicapped
individuals).
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Adverse employment decisions include: (1) refusing to
promote a handicapped individual; (2) denying a handicapped individual employment or the
benefits of a federally-funded program; and (3) limiting handicapped individual's duties.
CITE; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (1991) (defining the term "discriminate" to include
"limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects
the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such
applicant or employee.").
32. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1992) (commonly referred to as "Title
VII"). The Act provides: "No person... shall, on the ground of race, sex, color, or national
[Vol. 47:241
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crimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, or ethnic back-
ground.33 Section 504 grants handicapped employees all of the
remedies available under Title VII.34 Accordingly, courts often refer
to Title VII cases in interpreting Section 504.35 Courts, however,
have yet to apply the mixed-motive36 causation standard of Title VII
discrimination cases to Section 504 claims.37
In further pursuit of the goals underlying Section 504, Congress
recently passed the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),38
which also promises equal opportunity to individuals with disabilities.
The ADA applies to most private sector employers.39 Modeled after
Section 504 as well as Title VII, the ADA extends protection to per-
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
33. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293 n.7 (acknowledging that Section 504 was patterned
after Title VII); cf. Darrone, 465 U.S. at 632-33 n. 13 (recognizing distinctions between Section
504 and Title VII).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (1991) ("The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title
VI... shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act ... under section
794."). For example, handicapped employees can receive reinstatement and back pay. See
Lengen v. Department of Transp., 903 F.2d 1464 (11 th Cir. 1990). A court can award future
damages and even an expungement of records to vindicate the rights of an employee subjected
to handicap discrimination. Ross v. Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 680, 682-83 (E.D. Mich.
1988) (citing Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1160 (6th Cir. 1985)), appeal
dismissed without opinion, 844 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1988). Other courts have ordered that the
employer compute seniority rights of a discriminated applicant from the date of application for
employment. See Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954, 955 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
Furthermore, a successful employee can also receive damages for mental anguish, loss of
earnings, and attorneys' fees. See Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp.
1130, 1138-39 (S.D. Iowa 1984). Moreover, while punitive damages are not available under
Section 504, handicapped employees subject to discrimination may be entitled to punitive
damages under state handicap law. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(AIDS-infected employee recovered $50,000 in punitive damages under Pennsylvania law).
35. See, e.g., Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1461 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that because
Title VII does not apply to the military, neither does Section 504); Duran, 451 F. Supp. at 954
(stating that plaintiff could prove handicap discrimination under Section 504 by advancing the
disparate treatment and impact models applied in Title VII cases). But see Pushkin v. Regent
of University of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981) (court refused to apply Title VII's
burden of proof to Section 504 cases).
36. The term "mixed-motive" means that an employer has two motives for terminating an
employee, one of which is illegal. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989),
overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 12101-213 (1991). Under these circumstances, the. Supreme Court
required an employer to show that she would have made the "same decision" absent the
discriminatory motive. Id. at 258.
37. At least one court has specifically refused to apply a mixed-motive causation standard
under Section 504. See, e.g., Ross, 678 F. Supp. at 681-83.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1991).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A) (1991) (employers with fifteen or more employees are subject
to ADA's proscriptions). But see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B) (1991) (private clubs are not subject
to ADA).
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sons infected with contagious diseases.' Although based on Section
504, Severino may also adversely impact the legal framework adopted
by courts construing and applying the ADA.
1. ELEMENTS OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF HANDICAP
DISCRIMINATION UNDER SECTION 504
The Supreme Court initially construed Section 504 in Southeast-
ern Community College v. Davis,4 enumerating four elements
required to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination. 2
First, the individual must show that she is handicapped within the
meaning of Section 504.43 Second, she must establish that she is
"otherwise qualified" to perform the job." Third, the individual must
establish that she was discriminated against "solely on the basis" of
her handicap. 5 This is the causation prong of the Act. 6 Fourth, the
employer must be a recipient of federal funds.47
A physical condition is a "handicap" within the meaning of the
Act if it results in a "physical impairment" 48 that affects the perform-
40. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1991) (ADA) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1992) (Title VII);
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Notably, ADA expressly excluded homosexuality and bisexuality from its
definition of physical impairments and thus disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (a).
41. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
42. Id. at 405-06.
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Section 504 incorporates Section 706(8)(A) and its definition
of the term "handicap." Section 706(8)(A) defines "handicapped" as "any individual who (i)
has a physical ... disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial
handicap to employment." Section 706(8)(B) defines "individual with handicap" as a person
whose impairment substantially limits one or more of [her] major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such impairment." Id. § 706(8)(B)
(emphasis added). See generally Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Who is "Individual With
Handicaps" Under Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 40, 46-50 (1991) (listing
numerous impairments considered to be handicaps within the meaning of Section 504); see also
Maureen O'Connor, Defining "Handicap" for Purposes of Employment Discrimination, 30
ARIz. L. REV. 633 (1988).
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). See generally Colleen R. Courtade, Annotation, Who is a
"Qualified" Handicapped Person Protected from Employment Discrimination Under
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder?, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 830
(1991) (citing cases where courts have applied the "otherwise qualified" element of Section
504).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
46. See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causation prong.
47. Id. Federal agencies obviously are subject to Section 504. See id. Private institutions
such as universities and hospitals also are subject to the Act because they commonly receive
federal financial assistance. See, e.g., Pushkin v. Regent of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1376
(10th Cir. 1981) (university subject to Section 504's requirements). But see 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(ADA imposes no similar requirement).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The term "physical impairment" is defined in federal regulations
as "any physiological disorder or condition ... affecting ... neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory; reproductive; digestive; cardiovascular; lymphatic; skin;
endocrine [systems]." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1991).
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ance of "major life activities."49  Conditions such as excessive
weight,5" narcolepsy,51  epilepsy, 52 hepatitis," and alcoholism54 are
among the handicaps covered by the Act. Section 504 also includes
certain contagious diseases as handicaps." Courts addressing the
issue have held that HIV infection is a handicap under Section 504.56
These courts have thus applied the same burden of proof require-
ments to AIDS discrimination cases as other handicap discrimination
cases.57 Until the Supreme Court decides an HIV or AIDS discrimi-
nation case, however, uncertainty remains as to whether HIV infec-
tion (or AIDS) is a handicap under the Act.
Those favoring inclusion argue that including asymptomatic
HIV infection within the meaning of "handicap" encourages early
testing and thus helps prevent the spread of AIDS.58 The early test-
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Supreme Court has relied on the regulations promulgated
by the Department of Health in determining whether a physical condition qualifies as a
handicap within the meaning of Section 504. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278-79
(1987). The term "major life activities" includes working. See id. at 281; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102 (adopting the same definition of the term "disabled"); 45 C.F.R. 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1991)
(defining "major life activities" as including "functions such as caring for one's self
walking, sleeping, learning, and working").
50. Ross v. Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Mich. 1988), appeal dismissed
without opinion, 844 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1988).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa
1984).
53. Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
54. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 566 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); see also 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 2 (1977) (opining that drug addicts and
alcoholics are covered by Section 504). But see 42 U.S.C. § 12210(9) (1991) (drug addicts
engaging in illegal drug use are excluded from the protection of ADA).
55. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285-86 (1987).
56. See Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 632 (E.D. Mo. 1991); see also Chalk
v. Orange City Dep't of Educ., 832 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1987); Ray v. School Dist., 666 F.
Supp. 1524, 1536 (M.D. Fla. 1987). But see Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459-61 (1 th Cir.
1990) (holding that Section 504 does not apply to members of the armed services who are
HIV-positive or contract AIDS).
Similarly, courts have found that HIV infection qualifies as a handicap under state acts.
See, e.g., Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 677-79 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (attorney with AIDS
contested his termination and reassignment under the Pennsylvania handicap act); Petri v.
Bank of New York, 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (homosexual loan officer
challenged his dismissal under Human Rights Act and court concluded HIV infection was a
disability within the meaning of the Act); Benjamin v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d
814, 819 (W. Va. 1990) (HIV-infected exterminator challenged his dismissal under West
Virginia Human Rights Act); Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654, 656 (S.D.
Fla. 1986) (Florida handicap law interpreted as covering HIV infection and AIDS); see also
Chalk, 832 F.2d at 1157-58.
57. See, e.g., Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. at 632 (applying the burden in a suit by a
dental student against university that dismissed him after discovering his HIV-positive status).
58. Benjamin, 390 S.E.2d at 819 (argument accepted by Virginia court); see also Patricia
Mitchell, Employment Discrimination and AIDS- Is AIDS a Handicap under Section 504 of the
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ing rational has led some legal commentators to contend that federal
and state handicap laws should extend to persons perceived as HIV-
infected. 59 Opponents counter that Congress never intended to pro-
tect individuals not visibly physically impaired.'
The Supreme Court has held that "otherwise qualified" means
that an employee meets all of a job's qualifications "in spite" of her
handicap.6" Section 504 regulations provide that a "qualified handi-
capped" person means "a handicapped person who, with reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job."'62
Despite little guidance from the Supreme Court on application of the
causation element of a Section 504 claim, courts have vigorously
applied the "otherwise qualified" standard.63
2. AN EMPLOYER'S ACCOMMODATION DEFENSE
An employer may still prevail against a prima facie case by show-
ing either that it "reasonably accommodated" an individual's handi-
cap or that a "reasonable accommodation" would cause "undue
hardship." 64 Courts have imposed this affirmative duty on employers
so that handicapped individuals have meaningful access to employ-
Rehabilitation Act?, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 649, 670 (1986); Terry L. Pabst, Protection of AIDS
Victims from Employment Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act, 10 U. ILL. L. REV.
355, 378 (1987); Robert A. Kushen, Note, Asymptomatic Infection with the AIDS Virus as a
Handicap Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 566, 565-67 (1988)
(arguing that the broad purpose of the Act indicates that HIV infection comes within the Act's
protection because HIV infection is a physiological abnormality).
59. See Mitchell, supra note 58, at 670-71.
60. See Kushen, supra note 58, at 565-69.
61. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating
"otherwise qualified" means qualified in all respects except for being handicapped); see also
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (delineating employer's
accommodation responsibilities under Section 504 when interpreting the term "otherwise
qualified").
62. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1991) (defining "qualified handicapped person"); see also
Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1988) ("As a second step, the court
must evaluate whether reasonable accommodations would make the handicapped individual
otherwise qualified.").
63. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1136
(S.D. Iowa 1984) (applying regulations).
64. For a thorough discussion on the duty to reasonably accommodate handicapped
individuals, see Katharine W. Tate, The Federal Employer's Duties Under the Rehabilitation
Act: Does Reasonable Accommodation or Affirmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67 TEX.
L. REV. 781 (1987); Mark E. Martin, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning
of Discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 900
(1980); see also 80 A.L.R. Fed. 837, 838-48 (1986) (listing cases where accommodations were
necessary, where accommodations were not necessary, and where accommodations were not
considered).
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ment opportunities.65 In spite of this duty to accommodate, an
employer is not required to lower its standards or to make "substan-
tial modifications" to accommodate a person's handicap. The
employer is required only to make "reasonable" accommodations.66
Courts view the reasonableness of an accommodation from the
employer's perspective.67
Where an employer demonstrates that an accommodation would
result in "undue hardship," courts have not required the employer to
make the accommodation.68 By contrast, where an accommodation
can be achieved with minimal expenditure, courts will impose a duty
to accommodate on the employer.69 Significant factors in determining
whether an accommodation poses "undue hardship" include: (1) the
nature of the accommodation; (2) the type of employer operation;70
(3) the size of the operation;7  and (4) the cost of the accommoda-
tion.72 In short, an employer violates Section 504 by not providing an
accommodation deemed "reasonable" by the court.73
Because the handicap and federal-funding elements of a Section
504 claim usually are clear, the primary inquiries under Section 504
are whether the employee is "otherwise qualified" and whether the
employer's decision was improperly based "solely" upon the
65. See, e.g., School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987); Brennan v. Stewart, 834
F.2d 1248, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 307.
66. See Southwestern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413-14 (1979) (holding
that a college did not have to lower its educational standards or make major adjustments in its
clinical nursing program to accommodate a deaf nursing student); see also Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300-01 (1985).
67. See, e.g., Southwestern Community College, 442 U.S. at 413-14.
68. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 413-14. Under E.E.O.C. regulations, "[r]easonable
accommodation may include, but shall not be limited to (1) making facilities readily accessible
and usable by handicapped persons, and (2) job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules... and other similar actions." 29 C.F.R. 1613.704(b) (1991). See generally Steven
F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act:
How Much Must One do Before the Hardship Turns Undue, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311 (1991).
69. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1137
(S.D. Iowa 1984) (concluding that the employer could accommodate the handicapped
individual with minimal cost or administrative burden).
70. This factor includes the composition and structure of the workforce. See Davis, 442
U.S. at 413-14; cf. 29 C.F.R. 1613.704(c) (1991) (applying same factors in E.E.O.C.
legislation).
71. Significant factors in assessing the size of the employer include the number of
employees and locations and the size of the employer's budget. 29 C.F.R. 1613.704(c).
72. The E.E.O.C. regulation states: "An agency shall make reasonable accommodation to
the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified handicapped applicant or employee
unless the agency can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of its program." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a). See Prewitt v. United States Postal
Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying E.E.O.C. regulation).
73. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 589 F. Supp. at 1138 (holding that the school board failed to
accommodate a handicapped applicant when it imposed a driving requirement).
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employee's handicap. 74 The two inquiries are interrelated because
where an individual is not "otherwise qualified" to perform a job, a
court typically will conclude that an employment decision was not
based "solely" on the individual's handicap."
The "otherwise qualified" and "reasonable accommodation"
inquiries also are closely linked. For instance, if the employee cannot
perform a job's duties with an accommodation, she is not "otherwise
qualified" to perform her job "in spite" of her handicap.76 In sum, the
elements constituting a prima facie case of handicap discrimination
are significantly interrelated. The Severino court illustrates this inter-
relationship with its muddled analysis of Section 504's causation and
accommodation requirements.
B. Contagious Disease as a Handicap
In School Board v. Arline,77 the Supreme Court recognized a con-
tagious disease as a "handicap" within the meaning of Section 504. In
addition to the four elements of a Section 504 prima facie claim, the
Court enumerated other significant factors to consider in determining
whether an employee was "otherwise qualified" in cases involving
employees with contagious diseases.78  The Court insisted that
employers base decisions on an individualized investigation of these
factors. 79 Otherwise, an adverse employment decision such as termi-
nation would be "on the basis" of an individual's handicap in viola-
tion of Section 504.8o
74. Employers usually attack the "otherwise qualified" and causation elements of an
employee's prima facie case because of their fact-specific nature and statutory ambiguity. The
"otherwise qualified" requirement under Section 504 has what one court called, "a paradoxical
quality." Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988). This court reasoned, "[the
term] refers to a person that has the abilities or characteristics sought by the [employer], ...
yet cannot refer to those already capable of meeting all the requirements." Id. Otherwise, the
court concluded, no reasonable requirement could ever violate Section 504 no matter how easy
it would be to accommodate those individuals who could not fulfill a particular job
requirement. Id.
75. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981).
76. See Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1372 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that postal worker who could not perform the caddying work due to back injuries was
not "otherwise qualified" to perform her job) (relying on Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)).
77. 480 U.S. 273 (1987), reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987). For a detailed analysis of
Arline's impact, see generally Michael J. Pankow, Note, AIDS and the Rehabilitation Act After
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 21 CREIGHTON L. REv. 943 (1988); Robert P.
Wasson, Jr., AIDS Discrimination Under Federal, State, and Local Law After Arline, 15 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 221 (1987).
78. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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In Arline, a terminated elementary school teacher suffering from
tuberculosis brought an action against the school board under Section
504.81 The employer conceded that it had fired the teacher because of
her recurring tuberculosis.8 2 The district court found that she was
not a "handicapped individual" within the meaning of the Act, con-
cluding that persons suffering from contagious diseases are not handi-
capped.83 The district court further decided that even if she was
handicapped within the meaning of the Act, she was not "otherwise
qualified" to teach in an elementary school because of her contagious
disease.84 The appellate court reversed, ruling that tuberculosis quali-
fied as a handicap and remanded for further findings on the "other-
wise qualified" issue.8 5
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court on two grounds.
The Court first concluded that tuberculosis is a handicap within the
meaning of Section 504 because it resulted in the impairment of Ms.
Arline's respiratory system86 and, in turn, affected her ability to
teach.87 The Court specifically rejected the employer's argument that
tuberculosis was not covered by the Act because it was contagious
and posed a serious health threat to the children.88 Second, the Court
found the effect a person's impairment has on others significant in
determining whether the impairment qualifies as a handicap. 9 The
Court further recognized that even diseases perceived as contagious
are handicaps within the meaning of Section 504 because of the "pub-
lic fear and misapprehension" associated with contagiousness.' The
Court did not, however, address the question of whether AIDS or
HIV infection qualified as a handicap under Section 504 solely on the
81. Id. at 276-77.
82. Id. at 281.
83. Arline v. School Board, 772 F.2d 759, 761-62 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 759.
86. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281 (citing H.E.W. regulations). Thus, her condition satisfied the
"physical impairment" requirement of the Act.
Although AIDS obviously results in severe physical impairment, some legal
commentators contend that mere HIV-positive status is arguably not covered under the Act
since no physical impairment occurs during the early stages of infection. See Mitchell, supra
note 58, at 671; see also supra text accompanying note 58.
87. The Court found Ms. Arline's major life activities impaired by her recurring
tuberculosis-related hospitalizations. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279-81.
88. Id. at 281-82 (refusing to distinguish between the disease's contagious as opposed to
physical effects).
89. Id. at 283 n.10. Under this reasoning, HIV infection or AIDS qualifies as a
"handicap" within the meaning of Section 504 because of the public's misconception that both
are highly contagious handicaps a carrier's ability to obtain or maintain employment. See
Mitchell, supra note 58, at 665.
90. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
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basis of contagiousness.91
1. ARLINE'S INDIVIDUALIZED INQUIRY REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court next addressed the remaining question of
whether Ms. Arline was "otherwise qualified" for the job of school
teacher in spite of her handicap.92 The Supreme Court set forth four
basic factors for courts to consider in determining whether an individ-
ual suffering from a contagious disease is "otherwise qualified" to per-
form a job: (1) the nature of the risks associated with having the
employee continue working; (2) the duration of those risks; (3) the
severity of the risks; and (4) the probability that the disease will be
transmitted causing varying degrees of harm.93  The Court chose
these factors to ensure that the employer base its decision whether an
employee with a contagious disease is "otherwise qualified" on rea-
soned and medically sound information, rather than on stereotypes,
prejudices, and unfounded fears. 94 These factors allow employers to
consider such legitimate concerns as avoiding exposing others to "sig-
nificant" health and safety risks.95 The Court found the district
court's findings inadequate as to the "otherwise qualified" issue and
remanded the case to the district court.96 The Court stressed that the
district court must conduct an individualized inquiry and make
appropriate findings of fact, based upon reasonable medical judg-
ments, on the factors enumerated. 97
Under Arline, an employer is prohibited from treating all individ-
uals with a particular handicap as a homogeneous group. Instead, an
employer must individually assess each handicapped individual's
capabilities.98 If a reasonable accommodation is available, then an
91. Id. at 282 n.7.
92. Id. at 287.
93. Id. at 288 (quoting Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae at 19).
94. See id. at 287. In a later Supreme Court decision construing Section 504, Justice
Blackmun stated that Arline prohibits employers from "rel[ying] on generalizations, even
'reasonable' ones." Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 560-61 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
95. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287. The ADA reflects the same concern for the safety of others by
listing as a defense to an ADA claim that an individual "pose[s] a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace." See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1991). The term
"direct threat" is defined in the statute as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." Id. § 12111(3).
96. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288-89.
97. Id. at 287-88. The Court also advised lower courts to defer to the reasonable medical
judgments of public health officials in resolving this issue. Id.
98. See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 554-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(applying School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 285-86).
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employee suffering from a contagious disease is "otherwise qualified"
to perform the job at issue.
C. Federal Court Decisions Applying Section 504 to AIDS and
Other Contagious Diseases
Several courts applying Arline's analysis have recognized AIDS,
HIV infection, and other contagious diseases as handicaps under Sec-
tion 504.99 These courts have reasoned that the public's perception of
contagiousness is what makes the disease a handicap."° Whether the
Supreme Court will reach the same conclusion remains to be
determined.
Several courts have adopted Arline's individualized inquiry
requirement in determining whether an individual suffering from a
contagious disease is "otherwise qualified." For example, the Elev-
enth Circuit remanded a case to the trial court to determine whether a
dentist with hepatitis could safely resume practicing dentistry without
posing a threat to others and was thus "otherwise qualified" under
Section 504.101 After reviewing current medical data, a California
federal court ruled that the remote possibility of HIV transmission
from the tears, saliva or urine of a child with AIDS did not disqualify
the child from attending school. 10 2 Another court found that a uni-
versity had not improperly founded its decision to dismiss a dental
student with AIDS on stereotypes. Instead, the court found that the
university's decision was based on current medical knowledge of the
potential risk of HIV transmission, should the student be allowed to
participate in the dental program. 103 This risk, the court concluded,
resulted in the student not being "otherwise qualified" to participate
in the dental program."1 °4
By contrast, a state court recently concluded that all HIV-
infected persons were not "otherwise qualified" to perform worldwide
foreign service duty due to the lack of medical care available in cer-
99. E.g., Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 668 (11th Cir. 1990) (hepatitis deemed to be
handicap under Section 504); Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing AIDS as a handicap); see also Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F.
Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (child with AIDS was "handicapped person" under Section 504);
Local 1812 v. Department of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) (AIDS deemed -a
handicap protected under Section 504).
100. Local 1812, 662 F. Supp. at 54.
101. Lussier, 904 F.2d at 669.
102. See Martinez, 861 F.2d at 1502; see also Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 382 (although AIDS-
infected child had previously bitten a classmate, court ruled that the child could attend regular
kindergarten classes).
103. Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 632-35 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
104. Id. at 634.
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tain countries. 105 While this court did not apply Arline's individual-
ized inquiry requirement, most courts have faithfully applied the
requirement. Arline has thus generated a case-by-case analysis of
each individual's physical condition to determine whether that indi-
vidual is "otherwise qualified."
Courts similarly have applied the accommodation requirement
on a case-by-case basis. For example, in Fitzgerald v. Green Valley
Education Agency, 0 6 the court examined the business of an employer
that imposed a bus-driving requirement on a prospective handicapped
teacher. The bus-driving requirement would have made it impossible
for the applicant, who suffered from cerebral palsy and epilepsy, to be
considered for the teaching position. 0 7 The court suggested three
possible alternatives available to the employer. First, the court sug-
gested that the school board eliminate the need for the prospective
teacher to drive the school bus by assuming its legal responsibility for
transporting students. 0 8 Second, the court recommended that the
school board place the handicapped applicant in a district where
transportation duty was not required. 09 Third, the school board
could hire an independent carrier to transport students."10 The court
considered these options reasonable accommodations under the Arline
standard. ' I
While the Fitzgerald court's suggested accommodations may
appear extreme, other courts have required similar workplace accom-
modations. For example, courts have required employers to allow
hearing-aid users to continue as bus drivers despite employer prohibi-
tions to the contrary," 2 to hire readers for blind employees," 3 and to
modify architectural barriers as accommodations. 114 By comparison,
other courts have not required an accommodation where the individ-
ual's handicap posed a safety risk to herself or others.' The out-
come of an accommodation inquiry after Arline largely depends on
105. Local 1812, 662 F. Supp. at 54.
106. 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (handicapped teacher sued school board under
Section 504 for failing to interview him for a teaching position because of his inability to obtain
a bus driver's permit).
107. Id. at 1135-36.
108. Id. at 1137.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
113. Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985).
114. Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
115. See, e.g., Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D.C. Conn. 1987) (holding that plaintiff
suffering from dwarfism was not qualified for position as a distribution clerk at post office and
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what factors a court considers critical in balancing the respective
workplace interests.
In Arline, the Supreme Court failed to provide guidance for
determining whether an employer's decision was made "on the basis
of" or "solely" because of a handicap. This lack of guidance has
caused considerable conflict among the courts as to whether "solely
on the basis of" should be interpreted narrowly to mean that an
employee must show that the sole reason for an employment decision
was the employee's handicap; or broadly, to mean that an employee
must simply show that "but for" her handicap a particular employ-
ment decision would not have been made." 6 Because each interpreta-
tion poses a different evidentiary burden, the likelihood of success
under Section 504 depends on which causation analysis a court
adopts. Severino's majority and dissenting opinions illustrate the dif-
ferent interpretations of Section 504's causation requirement.
In conclusion, courts following Arline's framework have devel-
oped competing interpretations of the causation requirement under a
Section 504 claim. In contrast to other Section 504 contagious disease
cases, Severino applied Arline's analysis to an employee allegedly ter-
minated because he refused to perform the light duties assigned as an
accommodation, rather than because of his of HIV-positive status.
III. SEVERINO v. NORTH FORT MYERS FIRE CONTROL
DISTRICT-THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REDEFINES AN
EMPLOYEE'S PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER
SECTION 504
Mr. Severino had been a firefighter since 1987 with the North
Fort Myers Fire Control District.' After donating blood, he
received notification from the blood bank that he was HIV-positive. "18
Without providing any details, his doctor told him that he should not
perform firefighter rescue duties." 9 Consequently, Mr. Severino ten-
that possible accommodations were not reasonable inasmuch as they could endanger the
plaintiff and co-workers as well as reduce efficiency).
116. Compare Ross v. Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 680, 682-83 (E.D. Mich. 1988),
appeal dismissed without opinion, 844 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying a "but for" causation
standard) with Assa'Ad-Faltas v. Virginia, 738 F. Supp. 982, 987 (E.D. Va. 1989), afid, 902
F.2d 1564 (4th Cir. 1990) (interpreting the term "solely on the basis" as requiring employee to
show that handicap was the sole reason for dismissal) and Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113,
117 n.5 (8th Cir. 1985) (court applied a narrow causation standard in suit by legally blind
librarian against school district).
117. Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir.
1991).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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dered his resignation to the Fire Chief. 120 After consulting with legal
counsel,12 1 the Fire Chief reassigned Mr. Severino to light duty which
included maintaining fire hydrants, running errands, and delivering
trash to the dump. 22 Mr. Severino complained that the light duty
assignments were "demeaning. '1 23
Mr. Severino subsequently gathered information about AIDS,
presented it to the Fire Chief, and requested regular duty assign-
ment. 124 Simultaneously, he refused to continue performing the light
duty assignments.1 25 As a result, the Fire Chief put him on an invol-
untary ninety-day medical leave with pay. 126  When Mr. Severino
demanded that he be informed of his rights, the Fire Chief did not
respond to his demand. 127 The Fire Chief never permitted Mr. Sever-
ino to return to "full line" duty, and fired him when he would not
accept the light duty mandated to him. 128
Mr. Severino subsequently filed an action1 29 seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief as well as an award of compensatory and punitive
damages under Section 504. At the bench trial, Mr. Severino asserted
that the fire department violated his federal statutory rights as well as
his state and federal constitutional rights130 on three grounds: (1)
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, Severino (No. 90-3227).
128. Id. His letter of termination stated:
We have thoroughly investigated all the facts surrounding your employment with
the District. It is clear that once you announced that you had a communicable
disease, you informed the District that on advise of your physician, you could not
continue to perform the normal duties of a firefighter.
As you are aware, the District had no obligation to do so, but let you draw
firefighter pay while performing functions such as fire hydrant maintanence, [sic]
dispatching and various maintanence [sic] duties.
It is equally clear, after performing these functions for a limited time, that you
declined to perform them in the future. Specifically you refused to paint fire
hydrants or to make trips to the dump ....
Due to the fact you have refused or resisted performing the only job functions
that exist within the District, you leave me no alternative but to terminate your
employment ....
Letter from Dan R. Labelle, North Fort Myers Fire District Acting Chief, to Paul Severino,
Plaintiff (May 11, 1988) (on record as Plaintiff's Exhibit 9, Case No. 88-142).
129. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1181. Mr. Severino sued the fire district as well as members of
the North Fort Myers Fire Control Commission, in their official and personal capacities, and
Donald Brown, the Fire Chief, personally and in his official capacity. Id.
130. Mr. Severino also asserted due process and equal protection violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the fire department on the
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reassigning him to light duty, (2) requiring him to take involuntary
medical leave, and (3) dismissing him shortly afterward.'
The district court concluded that Mr. Severino failed to state a
prima facie case under Section 504 because his employer did not ter-
minate him "solely on the basis" of his HIV infection. 32 Instead, the
court found that Mr. Severino was terminated because he refused to
perform the light duties assigned to him as an accommodation.
33
Accordingly, the court ruled that the fire department did not discrim-
inate against Mr. Severino under Section 504. 
34
On appeal, Mr. Severino argued that the district court errone-
ously applied Section 504's causation and intent standards. 135 More-
over, he contended that the district court's findings were clearly
erroneous as to his conduct, as well as the motivation of the fire
department in making the adverse employment decisions.
136
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF SEVERINO
A. The Causation Requirement of Section 504-What Is
the Proper Standard?
The court of appeals found that Mr. Severino had not met the
causation element of Section 504 because he failed to show discrimi-
nation "solely on the basis" of his handicap.137  According to the
court, Mr. Severino was terminated because he refused to perform the
reassigned duties, rather than because of his HIV-positive status.
38
Thus, the court reasoned, his termination was not improperly based
solely on his HIV status. 139
In her dissent, Judge Kravitch criticized the majority for depart-
ing from the customary "but for" causation analysis applicable to Sec-
tion 504 cases. 4° She stressed that "solely by reason of her or his
handicap" does not mean that an employer can simply articulate any
due process claim. Id. Significantly, Mr. Severino asked to appeal his termination within the
fire department, but his request was denied. Appellant's Reply Brief at 8, Severino (No. 90-
3227).
131. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1181.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Appellant's Initial Brief at 37-40, Severino (No. 90-3227).
136. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1180-81. Severino also argued that the district court had
erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the fire department on his state and federal
due process claims. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 45, Severino (No. 90-3227).
137. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1183.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (Kravitch, C.J., dissenting).
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reason for discriminatory behavior other than the handicap in order
to defeat Section 504's causation element. 141 She cited several cases
where courts had found handicap discrimination if the employer dis-
criminated merely "on the basis of" an employee's handicap. 142 This
standard is analogous to the traditional "but for" tort causation stan-
dard. Under this standard, an employee has only to establish that
"but for" her handicap a particular adverse employment decision
would not have been made by an employer. 143
The dissent correctly criticized the court for requiring Mr. Sever-
ino to show that the sole reason for his termination was his handi-
cap.'" Such a narrow causation standard is almost impossible to
meet. Rejecting this interpretation of Section 504's causation require-
ment, one court noted "it would be a rare case indeed in which a
hostile discriminatory purpose or subjective intent to discriminate
solely on the basis of handicap could be shown." 14 Hence, this literal
reading of Section 504's causation requirement significantly increased
Mr. Severino's evidentiary burden because it required him to show
that his dismissal was based on no reason other than his HIV-infected
status.
The court should have further inquired into the motive underly-
ing Mr. Severino's reassignment. By failing to take this step, the
court engaged in circular reasoning and allowed the employer to pun-
ish the employee for refusing to perform the light duties without prob-
ing whether such duties were properly assigned. Section 504 prohibits
any discrimination or denial of a benefit to an employee because of a
handicap. 4 6 If the court had questioned the employer's decision to
place Mr. Severino on light duty, it would have found the necessary
causation element, based on the court's own findings that the
employer "did things too late" to ensure the assignment was not made
on the basis of Severino's handicap.147
141. Id.
142. Id. But see Assa'Ad-Faltas v. Virginia, 738 F. Supp. 982, 987 (E.D. Va. 1989), affid,
902 F.2d 1564 (4th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Section 504's causation element as requiring
employee to show that employer's sole reason for dismissal was handicap).
143. Cf Ross v. Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 680, 682-84 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (deciding
that because employer's evidence showed that several nurses and patients had complained
about a handicapped physician's abrasive behavior, physician was not terminated "because of"
her handicap).
144. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1183 (Kravitch, C.J., dissenting).
145. Pushkin v. Regent of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) (emphasis
added). The Pushkin court also refused to apply a rational basis test to determine whether the
plaintiff was discriminated against based on his handicap. Id. at 1383-84.
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1991).
147. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 20, Severino (No. 90-3227) (citing to bench trial
record).
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Arguably, the mere fact that Mr. Severino was required to take a
light duty assignment or no job at all was an adverse employment
decision based solely on his handicap in violation of Section 504. The
court should have found Section 504 liability on this adverse employ-
ment decision alone. Alternatively, the court should have found the
fire department liable by refusing Mr. Severino's request to return to
regular duty. The court should not have allowed the fire department
to assert the defense of "insubordination" to rebut Section 504 liabil-
ity because this reason was based on an improper consideration of the
handicap itself.'48
B. The Court Applies an Improper Intent Standard
The dissent also pointed out that the district court erroneously
required the plaintiff to show intentional discrimination even though
intent is not an element under Section 504. 149 The dissent recognized,
as have other courts, that handicap discrimination usually results
from "benign neglect" rather than "invidious discrimination."'150
Under the dissent's view, the fire department could be liable for negli-
gent discrimination under the Act.
The majority's intent standard would prove fatal to many handi-
capped individual's cases because most employers will not admit to
intentional discrimination. In Mr. Severino's case, however, the
employer's admission that Mr. Severino was assigned to light duty
merely because of his HIV-status revealed sufficient intent to discrimi-
nate, and should have satisfied even this tougher standard. Thus, Mr.
Severino should have prevailed under either an intentional or negli-
gent discrimination model.
C. Application of Arline's Framework to Severino
In assessing Mr. Severino's arguments, the majority found it sig-
nificant that Mr. Severino had volunteered to resign and that he had
told a friend that he was "going to sue the hell out of somebody.' 15 1
148. At least one court has required that an employer base its reason for denying a
handicapped individual a benefit on something other than consideration of the handicap itself.
See, e.g., Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1374.
149. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1184; see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296-97 (1985)
(refusing to construe Section 504 as requiring discriminatory intent).
150. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1185; see also Alexander, 469 U.S. at 296 (noting that
"discrimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather
than affirmative animus"); Pushkin v. Regent of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir.
1981) (noting that handicap discrimination "usually results from more invidious.., elements
and often occurs under the guise of extending a helping hand or a mistaken, restrictive belief as
to the limitations of handicapped persons.").
151. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1180-81.
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The majority emphasized the district court's characterization of Mr.
Severino as an "aggressive, distrustful, and a lawsuit-promoting per-
son."' 52 The court found that these alleged attributes justified Mr.
Severino's termination on the grounds of insubordination. 53
Judge Kravitch disapproved of the majority's reliance on such
irrelevant factors.' 4 She noted that the fire department introduced
no medical testimony to support certain of the district court's find-
ings, such as the finding that AIDS affected Mr. Severino's memory,
rendering him less credible.' 55 The dissent further criticized the court
for not recognizing the fire department's failure to follow its policy of
not terminating an employee without first giving the employee a writ-
ten reprimand after the employee's third offense.' 56 The dissent sug-
gested that this deviation from the fire department's well-established
policy undermined the employer's testimony. 57  Judge Kravitch
accepted Mr. Severino's argument that he changed his position once
he became aware of his rights, and therefore found Mr. Severino's
offer to resign irrelevant in determining whether he was discriminated
against. 5 8
Although the fire department presented evidence that Mr. Sever-
ino had exhibited "insubordination" problems prior to his disclosure,
the facts clearly reveal that Mr. Severino's problems began only after
his reassignment to light duties. One of the department's fire chiefs
even testified at trial that he was completely satisfied with Mr. Sever-
ino's performance as a firefighter prior to his disclosure. 59 Because
retaliation against an employee for filing a Section 504 claim is action-
able under the Act, Mr. Severino's termination due to his refusal to
perform duties illegally assigned would also be prohibited under Sec-
152. Id. In fact, in its appellate brief, the fire department characterized Mr. Severino as
having a pre-existing personality disorder which caused him to have feelings of paranoia,
delusions, and other manifestations of stress and emotional problems. Appellee's Brief at 4-5,
Severino (No. 90-3227).
153. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1180-81. Notably, the court accepted the fire department's
argument that Mr. Severino's personality led to his termination rather than his HIV-positive
status without requiring the department to show that Mr. Severino had past problems. See
Appellees' Brief at 4-5, Severino, (No. 90-3227).
154. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1186 (Kravitch, C.J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1183 n.l.
156. Id. at 1186.
157. Id. at 1185-86.
158. Id. at 1185. This argument also has been made in the Title VII context. See East v.
Romine, 518 F.2d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that an employer's refusal to hire a woman
welder because she was perceived as "disputatious" and had filed numerous complaints about
gender-based discrimination was an unlawful employment practice); Appellant's Reply Brief
at 7, Severino (No. 90-3227).
159. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 3, Severino (No. 90-3227).
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tion 504.'6° If a hostile relationship had developed between Mr.
Severino and the fire department, the court could have awarded
future damages as a remedy rather than reinstatement.161
D. Validity of the Fire Department's "Light Duty" Assignment
The Severino court sanctioned the fire department's decision to
place Mr. Severino on light duty without inquiring whether this
action was either necessary or reasonable. 62 The court did not focus
on the nature of Mr. Severino's light duties at all.163 Instead, the
court, in conclusory fashion, found that the modified duties were rea-
sonable."' The Severino majority based its conclusion partly on the
premise that an employee must show that he was discriminated
against "solely" on the basis of his handicap. 65 To support its deci-
sion, the court stated that Mr. Severino could have avoided termina-
tion merely by performing the light duties assigned to him.166 The
court ignored the fact that handicapped individuals have the right to a
meaningful as well as a reasonable accommodation.
Other employers have assigned employees to "light duty" as an
accommodation 67 The fire department, however, had several
options in accommodating Mr. Severino's perceived handicap. For
example, the department could have limited his "high risk" duties
while allowing him to continue performing his regular firefighter
duties. Duties such as driving the fire truck and assisting with putting
out fires do not pose a risk to co-workers or the public.'68 Consider-
ing the limited modes of HIV transmission, the fire department
should not have limited his duties so drastically at such an early stage
of his disease. As Mr. Severino's disease advanced to AIDS-Related
160. See Hoyt v. St. Mary's Rehab. Ctr., 711 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1983); cf Romine, 518 F.2d
at 340 (noting that conduct of an employee complaining about discriminatory treatment is
irrelevant in determining whether there is discrimination under Title VII). The ADA
similarly prohibits employers from retaliating against or coercing employees exercising their
rights under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (a)-(b) (1991).
161. Ross v. Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 680, 682 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (noting that where
a disharmonious or hostile employment relationship has developed, a court may properly
award future damages as an alternative to reinstatement).
162. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1182-83.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1367 (10th Cir. 1984)
(postal worker assigned to light duty because back injuries precluded her from carrying postal
bags).
168. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Complex ("ARC") 169 or AIDS, other kinds of accommodations
might have become necessary. At a later stage of the disease, the
"light duty" assignment might have been "reasonable" if the disease's
weakening effects affected Mr. Severino's ability to perform his regu-
lar firefighter duties. The light duty assignment at the asymptomatic
stage of his illness was thus improper. Furthermore, the fire depart-
ment's argument that it assigned Mr. Severino to light duty in good
faith or to be helpful should not have defeated Mr. Severino's Section
504 case. 1
70
More importantly, the court did not engage in the individualized
inquiry required by Arline. It found proper the Fire Chief's refusal to
accept a doctor's letter submitted by Mr. Severino, which stated that
Mr. Severino could safely perform his firefighter and rescue duties.17'
The fire department proclaimed an interest in ensuring the safety of
other employees and the public from the dangers of AIDS.7 2 Yet it
offered no evidence that the HIV virus had ever been transmitted by a
firefighter or any other employee performing similar tasks. Further-
more, the fire department consulted no public health authority, nor
did it perform a neutral medical inquiry in making its employment
decisions relating to Mr. Severino. 7 3 The fire department should
have based its decision to alter Mr. Severino's duties following his
HIV-positive disclosure on sound criteria, not unfounded fears of
risk. 7 4 Mere HIV infection is not a permissible ground for assuming
that Mr. Severino could not perform his functions as a firefighter. 17 5
Additionally, Mr. Severino did not have to disprove every possibility
of harm to the public. 7 6
The individualized inquiry required under Arline would have
169. AIDS-Related Complex is the catchall name given to a multitude of ailments resulting
from infection with the HIV virus but not yet reaching full-blown AIDS. See Dianne Harris,
AIDS We'll All Pay, MONEY, Nov. 1987, at 109.
170. See Pushkin v. Regent of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1372 (stating that there is no
"good faith" defense to a Section 504 case); Recanzone v. Washoe County Sch. Dist., 696 F.
Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Nev. 1988) (finding an award of compensatory damages for emotional
distress and humiliation appropriate where employer's thoughtless neglect resulted in
discriminatory actions against handicapped employees).
171. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1182; see also Appellant's Reply Brief at 8, Severino (No. 90-
3227) (Chief Brown testified that the letter was "not good enough" because he believed that
there was a theoretical risk of transmission of the HIV virus if Mr. Severino performed rescue
duties).
172. See Severino, 935 F.2d at 1182.
173. Appellant's Reply Brief at 5, Severino (No. 90-3227).
174. See id. at 5-6.
175. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979) ("[M]ere
possession of handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function in a
particular context.").
176. Cf. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (teacher with
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protected Mr. Severino from being terminated for failing to perform
the light duty tasks. At a minimum, the fire department should have
been required to show it had a valid concern for the safety and general
welfare of the public because of his HIV-positive condition. 177
Experts' assessments of the risks of HIV transmission in the work-
place would cast serious doubts on any such argument made by the
fire department. 178 An assessment of Mr. Severino's health based
upon reasoned and sound medical judgments would have revealed
that Mr. Severino could safely continue to perform the regular duties
of a firefighter. Even though the majority acknowledged that Mr.
Severino's handicap played a role in Mr. Severino's reassignment and
subsequent dismissal, it did not require the fire department to justify
the permanent reassignment of Mr. Severino. 17 9
More importantly, the court ignored the crux of the issue-that
Section 504 was designed to prevent all workplace discrimination on
the basis of handicap. A handicapped individual should not have to
"choose" between a menial job or no job at all unless the employer
can show that its employment decision is medically justified. Section
504's basic purpose is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not
denied jobs because of prejudice, irrational fear, and ignorance.1 80
Contrary to this policy, the Severino court allowed an employer to
discriminate against a handicapped employee based on speculative
fears as to the risk of transmission of AIDS from a firefighter to the
public and co-workers. The court's decision allows an employer to
avoid liability simply by assigning a handicapped employee a mean-
ingless job as an "accommodation." Severino thus stands for the
proposition that HIV-infected employees can be forced to accept
demeaning jobs or face termination for refusing to perform the new
duties assigned, even though the assignment was not medically
justified.
V. CONCLUSION
The significance of Severino lies in its policy implications. First,
employees fearing retaliation will be more reluctant to test for the
AIDS not required to refute every theoretical possibility of harm to obtain injunction
reinstating him to classroom duties).
177. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 283; Ross v. Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 680, 683-84 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) (concluding that physician's narcolepsy posed a safety risk to the hospital's
patients where employer demonstrated that the physician had fallen asleep during a surgical
procedure).
178. See Mitchell, supra note 58, at 650-51.
179. Severino, 935 F.2d at 1182.
180. Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 n.10.
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HIV virus as well as to inform their employers of the results. Second,
under the guise of preventing the spread of AIDS, employers can
avoid Section 504 constraints by assigning handicapped employees
meaningless tasks and then firing them for refusing to perform these
duties. Fairness, as well as Section 504, demand that employers not
discriminate against the 43 million handicapped individuals in the
United States' because of their handicaps. Severino reduces that
principle to little more than empty sentiment, signaling a disturbing
trend in handicap discrimination law.
Severino's holding reflects the current public fear of AIDS. By
leaping energetically into the fray, however, the majority seriously
eroded handicapped employees' protection under Section 504. The
consequence of the court's overreaction may be that HIV-infected
workers will join the ranks of the jobless because of prejudice and an
unwillingness to recognize that AIDS is an epidemic that requires
compassion-not banishment.
8 2
YVETTE OSTOLAZA
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (noting that census data, national polls, and other studies
reveal that persons with disabilities occupy an inferior status in our society).
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